The project cost control is an important goal for project control of owner under guaranteeing project quality. As the key stage for project implementation, project cost control plays a vital role. Therefore, establishing a good incentive mechanism will be helpful to promote design contractor to optimize design and reduce the owner's investment. At present, the incentive for design contractors has been extend from design phase to construction phase, but there seems no ideal way to determine incentive coefficient. Based on the theory of incentive contract design, introducing the prospect theory of behavioral psychology, this paper builds the incentive coefficient model which determines the incentive coefficient, and provides the basis for the incentive of owner to design contractors.
Introductions
70% of the engineering project cost has been basically determined at the design stage [1] . Owner and the design contractors prefer to pursue their economic interests, which has the relation of opposites rather than unity [2] . Owners establish the effective and reasonable incentive mechanism in the design phase which could mobilize the enthusiasm and active the conductors, prompting the contractor to reduce project budget and reduce the design change.
Many scholars at home and abroad have studied the subject that owner and conductors incentive mechanism, which based on the conductors of rational human beings. Zhu Bing analyzed incentive problems of the project cost in construction using principal-agent theory [3] . Li Lijun studied the engineering cost control problems using the principal-agent theory [4] . Schöttle Annett established incentive model from the angle of information asymmetry [5] . But psychology research found that the incentive effect contractors felt was not of expected utility, but that might be processed psychologically. Booij, Adam S applied prospect theory to study human's decision-making behavior, and felt that the actual utility people found not equal to the expected utility [6] . James C. Cox continued to set up incentive mechanisms by applying prospect theory [7] . This paper divides the existing incentive indices into design budgetary estimate indices, design schedule indices, reliable technique indices and design services indices. Using the incentive contract design theory and prospect theory, this paper explores the psychological effects of contractors at cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) contract mode. It is concluded that the maximize incentive coefficient of contractors is motived, and provides a more realistic theoretical basis for the incentive mechanism of design contractor.
Theoretical Basis Prospect Theory
Prospect theory explained people's decision-making behavior through the utility human felt, which was published in 1979 by Kahneman and Tversky. This theory has been successful used in explaining a wide range of empirical regularities that have been documented outside the laboratory when people face risk, such as the premium that equities demand over annuities in the market. The theory has become a major hypothesis for individual behavior in economic analysis. The content of prospect theory can be divided into value function and weight function.
Value Function. Value function focused on the human's gains and losses psychological effect. The shape of value function reflects the psychophysics of diminishing sensitivity. Value function has three important characteristics: 1) Relativity. Human's psychological "profit and loss" is a relative concept, which is losses and gains relative to a reference point. Psychologically subjective judgment to the results is relative to a natural reference point, while people pay more attention to the relative levels changing around a reference point.
2) Sensitivity. Gains and losses follows the law of sensitivity decreasing.
3) Loss aversion. When faced with the same amount of gains and losses, loss effects on people is greater than the utility.
Value function expression for benefits is:
Value function expression for loss is:
Where x represents the gain or loss relative to the status quo, λ > 1 is the coefficient of loss aversion, and both α and β ∈ (0, 1) are the curvature parameters of utility.
Weighting Function. In the decision-making of actual personal estimate of the probability is instructive thinking way in psychology instead of bayes' rule, penetrated decision weights of personal value sensibility factor. Probability weighting function for benefits is:
Probability weighting function for loss is:
Among them, γ and δ respectively represents the bending degree of probability weighting function of gains and losses, which reflects the decision-maker s' different attitude towards the risk, where 0 < γ < 1, 0 < δ < 1.
Building Incentive Model at Construction Design Phase

Confirming of Incentive Indicators at the Design Stage
On the bases of other scholars' research, this paper carries out four incentive indicators at design phase, which are divided into design budgetary estimate, design schedule, reliable technology and design service indicators. Contractor's incentive points of design budgetary estimate, design schedule, reliable technology and design service four indicators calculated on industry average A B , B B , C B , D B respectively in the tendering process.
The Construction of Incentive Mode
The Construction of Positive Incentive Model. Incentive coefficient model of design budgetary estimate, reliable technology and design service three indicators were basically uniform, so taken the design budgetary estimate indicator as an example, the paper built the incentive coefficient model.
(1) The benefits utility of contractor 1) The value function The data of budgetary estimate followed normal distribution 
Where ω was incentive coefficient for the owners, x was the saving budget amount for the contractor.
2) The probability weights In the motivation of the owner to the contractor, incentive interval was set up, and different incentive coefficient was set for different interval. Therefore, probability in the incentive interval for the contractor can be expressed as:
Incentive effect due to possible gains for the contractor as follows:
Where, x represented reduced design budgetary estimate relative to point incentives A B for the contractor.
(2) The loss utility of contractor Assumptions of the level of budgetary estimate can't break out its historical minimum level, the contractor saving design budgetary estimate of 0 implied the efforts of 0. Contractor's efforts can be regarded as monotone increasing function. Assuming that the contractor efforts can be expressed in the form of currency.
X represented the reduced design budgetary estimate relative to incentives point A B for contractor.
Loss utility of the contractor was:
When the effectiveness of obtaining the incentive for contractor was greater than the effectiveness of efforts, the contractor would have an incentive to reduce design budgetary estimate. The Construction of Design Schedule Incentive Model. Due to negative incentive was in top priority for design schedule of contractor, and self-interest dictated the contractor avoid loss, design schedule incentive didn't need to consider the utility, which need to be expressly agreed upon in the contract.
Based on design schedule incentive indicators of punishment only, the incentive model was expressed as
B −The actual design schedule of contractor ξ −The incentive coefficient for evaluating design schedule indicator by the owner.
Solution of the Model
This paper collected 2 x 600 mw thermal power engineering budgetary estimate level, design change level and loss level caused by design service in the calendar year of a contractor's design.
Solution of Contractor's Profit Utility
Calculated according to the collected contractor's design level, Suppose A B was 4.39465 billion yuan, C B was 7.9 million yuan, and D B was 6.15 million yuan. Then the saved design budget estimate, design changes and loss caused by design service was respectively in accordance with 
Solution of Contractor's Loss Utility
The effort costs of the saved design budget estimate, design changes and loss caused by design service was respectively represented as A πx L = 9.66tan 58400
.The utility function and probability weighting was α = β = 0.88 , λ = 2.25 , γ = 0.61 δ = 0.69 when suffering loss.
Solution of the Positive Coefficient
In the current engineering design fee standards, design fee charged base on design budgetary estimate. According to the experience of similar projects in the past, when the scale of thermal power engineering for 2 × 600MW, design budgetary estimate was commonly between 4 billion yuan and 6 billion yuan. According to schedule 1 of chapter 9 of the engineering survey and design fee standards manual, using interpolation method, the design fee was:
( ) 11897.5 -8276.7 1.8 S = C -400000 = (C -200000) 600000 -400000 100 (13)
It can be seen from this formula that toll coefficient of the design fee was 1.8%. Therefore, in order to guarantee the incentive effect, incentive coefficient should be at least 1.8%. The incentive coefficient was determined by the prospect theory when It can be seen from figure 5 that when the saved budget amount was less than 219 million yuan, the incentive coefficient of prospect theory was less than that of expected utility theory. The owner at this stage can take advantage of less incentive amount relative to the expected utility theory to meet the psychological utility of contractors. When the saved budget amount was more than 219 million yuan, the incentive coefficient of prospect theory was more than that of expected utility theory.
The contrast diagram of incentive coefficient of reliable technical indicator and design service indicator were shown in figure 6 and figure 7 . 
Solution of the Design Schedule Incentive Coefficient
In the contract, the owner can explicit the duration of the contractor to complete the design drawings. When construction drawings of single items of projects delayed delivery per 10 days, one-thousandth of the basic design fee receivable was punished. When the delay exceeded 30 days, punishment was doubled. Penalty amount was represented by the following. 
Conclusion
In this paper, prospect theory was used to analyze the four main indicators of the design phase. Psychological effects of the contractors were given full consideration to establish the corresponding incentive model. By an example, each incentive coefficient of the design contractor was calculated and the dynamic incentive coefficient curve was obtained, reaching dynamic and active management for the owner on incentive. Through this research, the owner can control contractor's incentive actively according to their own requirements and contractor's actual situation, prompting the contractor to reach the owner's demand as much as possible.
